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AN ATTEMPTED APPRAISAL OF "AN
ATTEMPTED APPRAISAL OF THE
WARREN COURT"*
W. CLARK HANNA**
Gilbert Nurick's comparison of the efforts to impeach Earl Warren
with the efforts to impeach John Marshall a century and a half before
(Pa. Bar QUARTERLY, March 1968) is a discerning and interesting ex-
cursion into U.S. legal history. Mr. Nurick goes on to argue that be-
cause subsequent history vindicated Marshall's highly unpopular opinions
extending federal power at the expense of the states, it should follow that
Warren's posterity may be expected to do the same for him, and that the
historians of the future will conclude that the Warren Court adhered to
the basic philosophy of Marshall eloquently enunciated in Cohens v. Vir-
ginia:
A constitution is framed for ages to come, and is designed to ap-
proach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it. Its
course cannot always be tranquil. It is exposed to storms and tem-
pests, and its framers must be unwise statesmen indeed, if they have
not provided it *** with the means of self-preservation from the
perils it may be destined to encounter. No government ought to be so
defective in its organization as not to contain within itself the means
of securing the execution of its own laws against other dangers than
those which occur every day.
AMENDMENT PROCEDURE
We submit that Mr. Nurick's argument is incomplete and falls short
of proving the desired conclusion. It is quite true that the Constitution
is provided with the "means of self-preservation." But this is not found
in any judicial power, specified or implied, to "self-preserve" it by judicial
interpretation, or reinterpretation, of issues already decided earlier. It
lies, on the contrary, specifically in Article V of the Constitution itself.
It consists of the four alternative methods of amendment by the people
acting through their representatives. These are legal-if you like, demo-
cratic-methods that the Framers wisely provided for changing the Basic
* This article was published in the PENNSYLVANIA BAR AssocIATION QUAR-
TERLY (June 1969).
** Member of the Pennsylvania Bar Association.
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Law as new conditions and well considered public opinion might require.
To believe that history always repeats is to perpetuate as fact a
proposition that history itself has proved over and over to be a fallacy.
Americans of the early 19th century and the world they lived in were
far, far different from those of the late 20th century. Mr. Nurick him-
self points this out. For that reason alone the vindication of John Mar-
shall by no means points with any certainty whatever to the vindication
of Earl Warren.
JUDICIAL POWER
But the issue really seems to hang on two broader and more basic
issues :
(1) The power of the judiciary to invalidate legislative and ad-
ministrative acts because in the judges' opinion such acts conflict with
(a) the Basic Law or
(b) the public interest as of the present time and locality;
(2) The power of the judiciary to modify or reverse in one case a
rule already settled by decision in an earlier case in the same court on the
same issue because in the judges' opinion
(a) the law was erroneously applied in the earlier case, or
(b) the rule laid down in the earlier case conflicts with the public
interest as of the present time and locality.
(1) (a) A court's power to declare a statutory or administrative
act unconstitutional when the question comes before it in an actual liti-
gated case is peculiar to American law and has not been seriously chal-
lenged since Marshall's Court first enunciated it in Marbury v. Madison.
Sir Edward Coke stood on much the same principle when he as-
serted the supremacy of the Law even over the Crown. Obviously the
interpretation and application of the law, constitutional, statutory and
administrative, is precisely what the judiciary is in business for.
(2) (a) By the same token, from time beyond memory an American
or English court has been accorded the power to decide a given issue in a
case before it quite at variance with conclusions which it reached on the
same issue in a previous case on the ground that it now finds that it mis-
applied the law in the prezious case.
With these two propositions there is little room for dissent. (1) (b)
and (2) (b) are a comparatively modern development.
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JUDICIAL-LEGISLATIVE POWERS
Invalidating a statute or regulation or reversing a prior court opinion
on grounds other than legal has been both attacked and defended by
legions of competent authorities over the years, especially since the Su-
preme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Warren in Brown v. Board
of Education in 1954, overturned the rule of Plessy v. Ferguson. The
latter was based on an interpretation of the 14th Amendment by the same
Court with a different bench over half a century before. We do not pro-
pose at this point to add another recruit to any of those legions, except
to renew the question whether such invalidation or reversal is not inter-
preting the Law but changing it-a legislative function, not judicial.
It may be asked, if the Marshall Court could invalidate a federal
statute in the Marbury case, why could not the Warren Court in the
Brown case reverse an earlier holding of what was technically the same
court, thus in effect voiding a state statute? It should be noted that the
former was a matter not of changing the Law, but of interpreting and
applying existing Law as a matter of first impression, to the case before
it. The latter was a changing, on non-legal grounds, of Law that was in
effect by virtue of its earlier Plessy decision. Moreover, it invalidated a
state law which the highest court of that state had upheld on the au-
thority of the Plessy case.
Theoretically (if not practicably) the Supreme Court can reverse
any of its own decisions from Marbury v. Madison on down, provided,
in some new case involving the same issue, it can devise plausible legal
reasoning to the effect that it applied the law erroneously in the earlier
case as the law was at that time.
According to the present trend of the Court's thinking, as exemplified
in Brown v. Board of Education and numerous others, it can also reverse
any of its earlier cases in deciding a new case if in the five-man wisdom
of a bare majority it finds that the public interest of the present day re-
quires it.
CENTRALIZED GOVERNMENT
As a practical matter the holdings of both the Marbury and Brown
cases appear to be quite safe in the hands of the United States Supreme
Court. Based though they are on completely different reasoning and
completely different legal and political philosophies, both serve to
strengthen centralized government at the expense of the states. For better
or worse, that is the way the tree has been inclined ever since Marshall
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bent the twig. There appears no present likelihood that the Court will
undertake to bend the full grown trunk the other way.
STARE DEcIsis
Lord Coke's dictum, "the knowne certaintie of the law is the safetie
of all," states a basic necessity in the maintenance of a stable society. If
no one can be certain of his legal rights and obligations because a court
may decide to change them due to its own ideas of a changed public
interest, no one can safely undertake new projects and new commitments.
Hence the well-known (but apparently obsolescent) doctrine of stare
decisis. We submit that once a court-any court-settles an issue in a
case before it, that decision should be considered Law as far as that
court-or any court of jurisdiction subordinate to it-is concerned, un-
less and until
(1) the decision is reversed on grounds of legal reasoning upon direct
appeal to a court of superior jurisdiction, or
(2) the same issue comes before the same court in a subsequent case
and it plausibly finds an errot of law in its prior decision, or
(3) the ruling is changed by appropriate legislative action, which means
constitutional amendment if interpretation of a constitutional pro-
vision is the issue.
SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND
We pose one more question as bearing on posterity's verdict on the
Warren Court. It was succinctly stated by Senator Sam Ervin (D.,
N. C.) as follows:
"There is not a word or syllable anywhere in the Constitution which
sustains the position that a Supreme Court's interpretation of a consti-
tutional provision constitutes the supreme law of the land. On the con-
trary, Article VI provides in unmistakable language that nothing con-
stitutes the supreme law of the land except the Constitution, acts of
Congress conforming to the Constitution and treaties made under the au-
thority of the United States."*
To state it another way, does the responsibility of state judges under
Article VI, Sections 2 and 3 run directly to the Constitution, acts of
Congress and treaties only, or does it extend to the labyrinth of case law
to be constructed subsequently by a Supreme Court that was a creature
* Human Events, Jan. 21, 1967, at p. 12 in review of The Warren Revolution
by L. Brent Bozell (Arlington House, 1966).
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of the Constitution and that did not come into existence until after the
Constitution itself became Law? We do not find either in Article III
defining the judicial power of the United States, or anywhere else in the
Constitution specific authority for the Supreme Court to review a con-
stitutional interpretation by the highest court of a state-or, for that
matter, specific authority for the Supreme Court even to entertain ap-
peals from the highest court of a state at all except in the classes of cases
enumerated in Article III, Section 2. It would seem that this is another
twig originally bent by the Supreme Court itself and nurtured into ma-
jestic treehood by long time universal acceptance.
Whether posterity vindicates Earl Warren as it did John Marshall
will therefore depend on whether posterity returns to the Rule of Law
(which includes changing the Law by the Law's own processes) as dis-
tinguished from rule by judicial interpretation and re-interpretation of
decided cases according to the judges' personal analyses of contemporary
conditions. If, and only if, the latter view continues to prevail, Warren
will be permanently "in" as-for different reasons-Marshall is now.
5
Hanna: An Attempted Appraisal of an Attempted Appraisal of the Warren Co
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1970
